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█ Abstract Hypotheses are the first step in scientific and clinical enquiry. They guide all of the subsequent 
steps in an investigation, and influence data collection, analysis, and interpretation. But how do we build 
scientific and clinical hypotheses? In both research and clinical contexts, a professional’s idiosyncratic way 
of perceiving reality, her prejudices and biases will influence the process of hypothesis formulation. We 
compare the process of formulating a scientific hypothesis in the field of neuroscience with the process of 
building a clinical hypothesis in the systemic therapeutic approach. This comparison is intended to high-
light the biases that influence researchers and clinicians when formulating hypotheses. Our aim is to raise 
awareness of the most common biases, and to point out how the tools developed by clinicians could be 
useful to researchers, and vice versa. 
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█ Riassunto La costruzione di ipotesi nella psicologia clinica e nella neuroscienza: similitudini e differenze – 
Le ipotesi sono il primo passo della ricerca scientifica e clinica. Sono la guida di tutti i passi successivi e 
influenzano la racconta dei dati, la loro analisi e l’interpretazione. Come si costruiscono le ipotesi scienti-
fiche e quelle cliniche? Sia nell’ambito della ricerca che nei contesti clinici le idiosincrasie con cui un pro-
fessionista percepisce la realtà, i suoi bias e pregiudizi influenzeranno il processo di formulazione 
dell’ipotesi. In questa sede intendiamo confrontare il processo di formulazione di un’ipotesi scientifica nel 
campo della neuroscienza e il processo di costruzione dell’ipotesi clinica nell’approccio della terapia siste-
mica. Questo confronto vuole mettere in luce i bias che influenzano ricercatori e terapeuti nella formula-
zione delle ipotesi. Il nostro scopo è mettere in luce gli errori sistematici più comuni, mostrando come gli 
strumenti sviluppati dai terapeuti possano essere utili per i ricercatori e viceversa. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Ipotesi; Psicologia clinica; Neuroscienza; Bias; Approccio interdisciplinare 

IN THIS PAPER, WE DISCUSS how hypothe-
ses are formulated in psychotherapy and in 
neuroscience. In particular, we analyze some 
similarities and differences between the ways 
in which hypotheses shape clinical investiga-
tions on the one hand, and neuroscientific 
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practice on the other. With respect to clinical 
investigations, we restrict our attention to the 
interactional-systemic psychotherapeutic ap-
proach – as originally formulated by Gregory 
Bateson and Paul Watzlawick1 – since this ap-
proach focuses specifically on constructing 
hypotheses, and devotes special attention to 
the influence of the therapist on the treat-
ment. 
We usually think of clinical and scientific 
observations in terms of an objective, passive 
registration of the data; however, as Ramón y 
Cajal suggested,2 even observation cannot be 
accomplished without the guidance of a hy-
pothesis. Thus, we share the view that hy-
potheses have a considerable impact on data 
collection, and therefore on research results. 
For these reasons, it is important to un-
derstand how clinical and scientific hypothe-
ses are formulated, and to examine the simi-
larities and differences between them. 
 
█  How to build a systemic clinical hypothesis 
 
Building hypotheses is a central and fun-
damental step in family treatment within the 
interactional-systemic psychotherapy frame-
work for they guide the systemic therapist in 
investigating the relational interplay within 
families.3 A systemic hypothesis consists of a 
supposition, formulated by the therapist, as 
to why an individual or a family acts the way 
they do, even after such behaviors have prov-
en to elicit unhappiness.4 One of the ground-
ing ideas of the systemic approach is that 
psychological symptoms, even though they 
generate discomfort, are not dysfunctional 
behaviors.  
More specifically, the behavior exhibited 
by an individual or her family represents an 
adaptive response that emerged at a given 
point in that individual or family’s history. 
The fact that a particular symptom causes 
discomfort at the current moment suggests 
that these responses were generated when 
they were appropriate to a particular condi-
tion that has changed in the meantime. It 
might be that an originally useful coping 
mechanism ended up being more disruptive 
than protective or that, by discussing the sit-
uation more explicitly in the therapy, the par-
ticipants can find the necessary resources to 
enact a better solution. 
Let us consider a practical example of a 
young boy displaying dramatic obsessive-
compulsive behavior. At first glance, it would 
be difficult to explain why he is unable to 
leave his room until the whole house has 
been disinfected. After scrutiny, however, the 
therapist may hypothesize that such behavior 
is holding the family together, effectively re-
organizing the parents’ life around the son’s, 
and thus maintaining the status quo of the 
family as a united nucleus during a phase 
when the child and parents might otherwise 
have grown apart. In order to be systemic, a 
hypothesis should: 
 
1. Include the individual displaying the dys-
functional behaviors together with her 
family or important relationships. A prin-
ciple of the systemic approach is that no 
individual behavior can be understood in 
isolation from its context, and that rela-
tionships are the context of psychological 
wellbeing. When treating a family, there-
fore, the therapist will have to include all 
family members in the hypothesis of how 
the family functions, and not only the one 
(or ones) displaying the dysfunctional 
symptoms. A psychological symptom can 
only be understood in the context of the 
network of relationships where it has 
emerged.5 In the example above, had the 
adolescent enjoyed a secure attachment to 
his parents, and had he perceived that 
their union was based on solid ground 
that would not have been shaken by his 
becoming more adult and independent, 
he would probably not have found it nec-
essary to display a symptom in order to 
hold the family together. 
 
2.  Be formulated as a working supposition, 
that the therapist can use to investigate 
the relationships of a patient, rather than 
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as esoteric truths to be proven. Selvini ar-
gues that the functional value of a hy-
pothesis in family therapy is to warrant 
the activity of the therapist in tracking re-
lational patterns.6 
 
3. Include the therapist in the system. By in-
teracting with the family, and pursuing 
evidence that will help build and delve 
deeper into the hypothesis, the therapist 
gains information on how each part of the 
family system works in relation to the 
others (and to the therapist). The system-
ic approach refers to this stream of infor-
mation from the family to the therapist, 
and back, as circularity.7 
 
4. Assume that relationships and interactions 
cannot be understood in a linear frame-
work of cause and effect. Individuals are 
immersed in complex relational systems 
that evolve through time, and attempting 
to find a single cause for complex behav-
iors would mean ignoring the very nature 
of relationships. No single event or behav-
ior observed at a certain moment of time 
can be mistaken as the individual cause of 
a symptom or of a repeated pattern, espe-
cially when considering the symptom of 
the individual in the wider framework of 
the individual’s significant relationships.8 
 
5. Be considered as one of the many possible 
ways to give structure to the information 
about a system. In the systemic perspec-
tive, it is important to keep in mind that 
our ideas are never faithful representa-
tions of an immutable truth, but possible 
perspectives that organize thoughts. Cec-
chin argued that the filter through which 
we perceive reality has been constructed 
over years of interactional experience 
with others, making it impossible for us to 
be free of biases or prejudices.9 
 
6. Be useful. Since there is no truth to dis-
cover, it is important to remember that 
the most sophisticated hypothesis formu-
lated by the therapist will be useless if it 
does not help the family by providing a 
novel point of view on the situation. From 
this point of view, even hypotheses that 
prove to be wrong provide useful infor-
mation, by eliminating some variables.10 
 
█  How to build a scientific hypothesis 
 
«Three successive operations are necessary 
in all scientific research: observation and exper-
imentation, hypothesis or supposition, and 
proof».11 Scientific hypotheses are inspired by 
the desire to find an explanation for a natural 
phenomenon. In order to formulate a hypothe-
sis, then, a researcher would have to observe a 
phenomenon of interest and be dissatisfied 
with existing explanations. Indeed explanations 
for natural phenomena have been proposed 
since the dawn of time and, however extrava-
gant ancient explanations may seem to us now, 
they were once widely believed.  
Consider the case of what was thought to 
hold up the Earth: for the ancient Greeks it 
was the giant Titan named Atlas, and for the 
native Americans and Chinese a giant turtle. 
Neuroscience has also had its share of fla-
wed/erroneous explanations. One of the most 
popular theories about the mind/brain was 
the cell doctrine, formulated by Galen around 
200 BC, a theory that held sway for a thou-
sand years. According to this view, brain ven-
tricles were the seat of all mental functions, and 
the liquid that they contained, called pneuma, 
flowed through the body in small tubes, the 
nerves, to control body functions. Attempts 
were even made to correlate specific ventricles 
with specific functions. This theory had a 
strong and lasting influence on our understand-
ing of how the central nervous system worked, 
while differences between the gray and white 
matter in the brain were ignored for centuries. 
Formulating a hypothesis therefore means 
looking for an alternative explanation, rather 
than offering an explanation for a phenomenon 
not yet understood. As Ramón y Cajal himself 
pointed out, dissatisfaction with a current ex-
planation itself bears the mark of subjectivity: 
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an a priori dislike for a rather widely held tenet, 
or interest in finding an alternative explanation 
for a natural phenomenon can stimulate a re-
searcher’s subjectivity, and her idiosyncratic 
ways of perceiving reality.12 
Once a researcher formulates a general 
hypothesis, she must then operationalize it in 
order to test it. To be testable, hypotheses 
have to be falsifiable. An established scien-
tific hypothesis will be considered to stand 
until new data disproves it. 
In the frequentist approach, hypotheses 
are tested against the null hypothesis that any 
kind of variance present in a set of data is 
due to chance. Frequentist statistical analyses 
provide p-values and confidence intervals 
that are used to interpret whether the null 
hypothesis is true or not. Frequentist hy-
pothesis testing consists in asking the ques-
tion: given this data, can I say, with a likeli-
hood of being wrong less than a fixed thresh-
old (usually 5%), that this difference is ran-
dom? Deciding to either reject the null hy-
pothesis (that the difference is not greater 
than what could be expected from random 
variation) in favor of the alternative, or to 
not reject it, is called hypothesis testing.13 
For example, to test the hypothesis that 
the visual processing of faces recruits specific 
brain areas that are not as active in pro-
cessing any other object,14 researchers would 
need to compare brain activation in response 
to faces to activation in response to other 
similar objects that while sharing as many 
properties as possible with faces, are still not 
faces. In this case, the null hypothesis would 
be that the difference in brain activation as-
sociated with these object and actual face 
processing is what might be expected due to 
random variation, and no more; the experi-
mental hypothesis will be that these two 
types of stimuli elicit different activation pat-
terns. In order to decide whether to accept 
the null hypothesis or the alternative, re-
searchers have to compare the activation pat-
terns in response to faces with the activation 
patterns in response to other objects. In or-
der make sure that any difference found in 
these patterns is due to faces being processed 
in a unique way, researchers will have to 
compare faces with objects that are matched 
for as many qualities as possible (e.g., they 
have the same low-level features in terms of 
luminance, spatial frequency etc., the same 
familiarity and emotional valence, and so 
on). If these conditions are not met, the ex-
periment is flawed, as the difference in the 
activation patterns could be due to one or 
more of these other qualities that differed for 
faces and objects, and it will be impossible to 
ascribe the activation pattern as being unique 
for faces. Once all other variables have been 
controlled for, if the difference in the pat-
terns for faces and other objects is larger than 
what can be explained by random variation, 
the null hypothesis can be rejected, and the 
experimental hypothesis that face visual pro-
cessing recruits specific brain areas that are 
not involved in the processing of any other 
object can be accepted.  
In recent years, Bayesian statistics has be-
come increasingly popular in neuroscience as 
it offers an approach to hypothesis testing 
that is not as binary as that of classical infer-
ential statistics. Rather than asking if it is 
possible to accept or reject a hypothesis with 
a fixed amount of probability of being wrong, 
Bayesian models compare reality (i.e., empir-
ical data) with the predictions derived from 
two competing scientific theories15, and test 
which theory explains the data better. The 
output of a Bayesian analysis represents the 
probability that the data under study could 
have been produced by assuming a given 
model to be accurate. Therefore, if in the 
frequentist approach the probability of an 
event is measured as the frequency of this 
event under the same repeatable conditions, 
in the Bayesian approach the probability of 
an event is measured as a degree of belief.16 
From a gnoseological point of view, the 
distance between classical hypothesis testing 
and Bayesian statistics is somewhat similar to 
the distance between the truth-seeking psy-
chologists of the Freudian era and the con-
structivism of the systemic approach. 
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█  How do hypotheses shape clinical and 
scientific investigation? 
 
Both the scientific community and the clin-
ical group of the Milan Approach have often 
debated several issues concerning the influence 
that researchers or clinicians may have in a sci-
entific or clinical setting, respectively. 
First, it has been proposed that putting a 
system under observation already changes 
that system, an effect known even in the 
realm of particle physics under the name of 
the “observer effect”.17 In physics, this refers 
to the fact that including an instrument for 
data collection in the experimental environ-
ment will, by necessity, alter the state of what 
is measured in some manner. Likewise, the 
presence of a clinician in the clinical setting is 
expected to alter the behavior of the people 
under scrutiny. In addressing these issues the 
scientific and clinical community have 
adopted solutions that share this recommen-
dation: if it is not possible to exclude the in-
fluence of the measuring tool, consider that 
the system you are observing includes it, and 
that you are effectively studying the larger 
system composed of the original experi-
mental environment plus the measuring tool 
in a complex interaction. In clinical settings, 
the observed system will consist in the inter-
action between patients and therapists. Un-
derstanding how a particular tool works will 
help the experimenter evaluate what part of 
the variance can be ascribed to its presence, 
just as a good knowledge of the therapist’s 
own biases and prejudices will help her to be 
aware that what she perceives is just a per-
ception, and to recognize that it is not possi-
ble to objectively observe reality. As Bateson 
puts it, «the map is not the territory».18  
 Second, another effect related to the 
presence of the experimenter/observer, is the 
observer-expectancy effect:19 having a pre-
diction about how a system will work neces-
sarily affects the interpretation of the data. In 
addition, human participants tend to comply 
with social expectations. In scientific experi-
ments this bias is usually corrected by using 
blind designs.20 In a blind design, neither the 
person carrying out the experiment nor the 
participants performing it are aware of the 
experimental hypothesis, nor of the experi-
mental manipulations. However, even when 
the hypotheses are hidden from both partici-
pants and experimenters, their knowledge 
that they are taking part in an experiment 
can still influence outcomes. Participants will 
expect to be subjected to some kind of ma-
nipulation, and even if they are unaware of 
the nature of this manipulation, this know-
ledge can still alter their observed behavior. 
In addition to all of these biases that can 
arise when planning and carrying out an ex-
periment, each researcher can add variance 
to the experimental results by analyzing the 
data in a given way, as there is no single way 
to understand and analyze the data. This 
phenomenon is known as the “secondary ob-
server effect” and has been described as an 
idiosyncratic variation, directly or indirectly 
produced by the researcher(s) that can lead 
to significant changes in the findings.21  
Alongside these biases, we should also keep 
in mind that, both in experimental settings 
and in everyday life, people tend to seek con-
firmatory evidence, and rarely try to falsify 
their own hypotheses or viewpoints. This ten-
dency to seek only information that will con-
firm previous beliefs, rather than information 
that could overturn them, was first explored 
by Wason22 in the sixties with a series of 
thought experiments, and has implications for 
both experimental and clinical settings. 
In clinical settings, it is of course impossi-
ble to keep the clinician and the patient in 
the dark as to the reason for their meeting. 
When psychology was first established as a 
practice the mainstream idea was that the 
therapist should be as neutral as possible, 
striving to be a “blank screen”, to serve as the 
reflecting mirror of the patient’s thoughts 
and emotions. Freud, in his Further recom-
mendations in the technique of psychoanaly-
sis,23 insisted that therapists should remain 
neutral, saying only as much as was absolute-
ly necessary to keep the patient talking. In 
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order to achieve such neutrality, therapists 
went through long therapies that also served 
as part of their training to become therapists. 
In the relationship with a perfectly neutral 
therapist, a patient could enact her own 
needs, feelings and ways of interactions out-
side of the therapy setting, in a phenomenon 
referred to as “transference”.  
Transference was seen as both an imped-
iment to the therapy, and as a tool to identify 
the work that needed to be done: «the trans-
ference, which, whether affectionate or hos-
tile, seemed in every case to constitute the 
greatest threat to the treatment, becomes its 
best tool».24 Of no use, on the other hand, 
were the therapist’s reactions to her patient, 
the «result of the patient’s influence on [the 
physician’s] unconscious feelings», often re-
ferred to as “countertransference”:25 these 
were considered to be purely a personal prob-
lem of the analyst, who should not let such 
feelings interfere with the therapy. 
It is now widely acknowledged that perfect 
neutrality on the part of the therapist is not re-
alistic.26 Therapists in training are rather en-
couraged to understand their personal biases as 
deeply as possible, in order to take their influ-
ence into consideration when treating a pa-
tient, rather than struggle to achieve neutrality. 
From a constructivist point of view, the ob-
server is recursively connected to the observed 
system; it is therefore crucial that therapists re-
flect on themselves.27 
In the systemic approach the idea that the 
therapist has an influence on the patient 
takes a step forward and is considered to be a 
useful instrument in her work rather than an 
obstacle. In the systemic view, no person ex-
ists outside of relationships, and observing 
the patients immersed in their relationships, 
including the relationship with the therapist 
herself, is the most fruitful path towards un-
derstanding how pathological dynamics have 
formed and are maintained across time. Cec-
chin suggests that observing the interactions 
between the therapist’s and the patient’s bi-
ases can be very informative, and argues that 
striving to achieve neutrality would mean 
giving up a most useful therapeutic tool.28 
 
█  Discussion: What can these two methods 
of building hypotheses teach each other? 
 
When considering the scientific and the 
clinical methods for building hypotheses, at 
first glance it seems that these processes are 
rather different, and that no benefit can be 
derived from analyzing them together. We 
believe, however, that this is not the case, and 
that both the scientific and clinical commu-
nities could gain from a better understanding 
of their respective assumptions and methods. 
Among the basic assumptions of the scien-
tific method which could be useful to clini-
cians, we would include the habit of always 
being open to an alternative hypothesis to test 
against the working hypothesis. As we have 
mentioned above, having a single hypothesis 
in mind can heavily bias both the observation 
phase and subsequent analyses. By contrast, 
keeping multiple hypotheses in mind can help 
clinicians reduce the influence of any single 
hypothesis. This is particularly relevant, as 
mentioned earlier, since we have the tendency 
to seek information that confirms our hy-
potheses;29 keeping multiple hypotheses in 
mind would prompt clinicians to consider all 
data, and not just the bits that are useful for a 
single current hypothesis. 
On the other hand, there are many lessons 
that scientists could learn from clinicians. 
The first one would surely be that our under-
standing of reality is always subject to the 
way we observe it and that objectivity does 
not exist, even when we rely on the scientific 
method. In our positivistic view of science, 
we tend to believe that the latest understand-
ing of a phenomenon is the correct one (in 
fact, the only correct one).  
Scientists could learn from clinicians to be 
mindful of their own biases, and the unavoid-
able existence of these biases, as objectivity 
does not exist. Understanding that a scientific 
theory can only ever be a representation of the 
truth, could furthermore help scientists re-
member that the hypothesis one accepts is on-
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ly valid under the precise conditions in which 
the data supporting that hypothesis was ob-
served, and does not have universal value; that 
the value of a hypothesis does not lie in how 
true it is, but in how useful it is in terms of 
leading to further exploration. Scientists tend 
to consider science as a collection of universal 
truths, and forget that all knowledge is merely 
a useful representation under the circum-
stances in which it has been acquired; being 
mindful of this could also help encourage the 
clinician to consider variables in the context 
other than the one under study.  
As a final remark, clinicians can remind 
scientists that the force that propels all ef-
forts to understand reality should be curiosi-
ty, rather than the desire to be right.  
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